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Infrastructure · Boston, United States · 1991–2007

Central Artery/Tunnel Project (Big Dig)

Planned in 1982 at $2.8 billion for completion in 1998, Boston's Central Artery/Tunnel Project finished in December 2007 at $14.6 billion before interest.

+421%cost overrun
10 years lateagainst the first plan
$22.7 billionactual cost in 2025 dollars
Over budget and lateconfidence: medium

Big Dig as a Gantt chart: planned vs actual

Schedule by phase
PhasePlannedActual
Planning and environmental reviewnot published1982 – 1991
Ted Williams Tunnel (I-90 harbor crossing)not published1991 – Dec 1995
Cost growth and federal scrutinynot published1996 – 1997
Central Artery tunnels (I-93) and Zakim Bridge? – 19981991 – Mar 2005
Surface restoration and close-out? – 19982005 – Dec 2007

The plan

Planning for the Central Artery/Tunnel Project began in 1982, with environmental studies from 19831. The idea was to replace Boston's elevated Interstate 93, which cut downtown off from the waterfront, with tunnels beneath it, and to extend Interstate 90 under the harbor to Logan Airport1. The first estimate was $2.8 billion, with completion in 19981.

Congress passed the funding bill in 1987, overriding a veto by President Reagan, who called it too expensive1. By the start of construction the scope had grown, and the estimate stood at $5.8 billion, including a new crossing of the Charles River1. The Massachusetts Highway Department, and later the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, ran the program with a Bechtel and Parsons Brinckerhoff joint venture as manager1.

There was no single rebaseline. Instead, the state published a series of rising official estimates, which federal auditors at the General Accounting Office (GAO) examined in 1996 and 199723.

What actually happened

Planning and approvals, 1982–1991

Environmental review took about seven years, and the federal clearances were not complete until 19941. Inflation during that period alone raised the estimates. The design also changed: a lawsuit from Cambridge forced a redesign of the Charles River crossing1.

Ted Williams Tunnel, 1991–1995

Ground was broken in 19911. The first major piece, the I-90 harbor crossing named the Ted Williams Tunnel, opened to limited commercial and high-occupancy traffic in late 19951. It could not carry its full traffic until the connections on land were built, which were scheduled for 20013.

Cost growth and federal scrutiny, 1996–2000

In July 1996 GAO testified that the official $7.8 billion estimate left out more than $1 billion of costs counted in earlier estimates and made no allowance for inflation. GAO's own figure was $10.4 billion, and it warned that costs could exceed $11 billion2. By March 1997 the state's estimate was $10.8 billion, with substantial completion scheduled for December 20043.

Contract changes were running at 17.4 percent of bid prices against a goal of 10.7 percent3. In 2000 the Turnpike Authority's chairman, James Kerasiotes, was fired, and his successor committed to an $8.55 billion cap on federal contributions1.

The I-93 tunnels, 1991–2006

Downtown, the tunnels were dug beneath the elevated highway while it stayed open to traffic, which meant building slurry walls first and supporting the old structure during excavation1. The I-90 connector opened in January 2003, the I-93 northbound tunnel on 29 March 2003 and the southbound tunnel on 20 December 20031. The last downtown ramp opened on 13 January 20061.

Leaks, the ceiling collapse and close-out, 2004–2007

A major leak closed the northbound tunnel on 15 September 2004, and reports counted hundreds of leaks1. On 10 July 2006 about 26 tons of concrete ceiling and hardware fell onto a car in the I-90 connector and killed Milena Del Valle51. The National Transportation Safety Board found that the anchor epoxy could not sustain long-term loads, and that anchor displacement seen in another tunnel in 1999 had not been followed up5. The project was declared complete in December 2007 at $14.6 billion, or about $21.93 billion including interest1.

Why it went the way it did

The first estimate preceded the scope

The $2.8 billion figure was set in 1982 for a project that later added interchanges, a redesigned river crossing and extensive mitigation for the city1. By construction start the estimate had already doubled to $5.8 billion1. Much of the overrun is the difference between a sketch and a project.

Estimates mixed price bases

GAO found that the official 1996 estimate excluded inflation and some earlier costs2. Over a 25-year program, comparing 1982 dollars with year-of-expenditure dollars overstates growth, which is why Flyvbjerg, measuring in real terms, puts the overrun at 220 percent rather than the 421 percent nominal figure41.

Dependent work under a working city

Before digging could start, utility lines had to be moved or replaced, and crews kept meeting landfill, old foundations and sunken ships1. Every downtown tunnel contract depended on that work and on keeping the elevated road, subway and rail lines running above it13. When one step ran late, the next waited, the pattern described in our article on task dependencies. GAO noted the state was changing how it bid underground obstruction removal to avoid such delays3.

Contract cost growth above its limits

In its 1997 report GAO traced recent growth to bids above projections and design estimates over budget, about $500 million in a single year, and found contract changes well above the state's containment goal3. Underground tunneling, which officials themselves called inherently risky, left little room to recover2.

Lessons for project managers

  1. Quote a price only after the scope is set. The 1982 estimate described a smaller project than the one built. A number given to legislators before scope is frozen becomes the baseline anyway.
  2. State the price base with every estimate. Big Dig figures mixed constant and inflated dollars, so the size of the overrun depends on who is counting. Publish the base year and the exclusions.
  3. Sequence enabling works as their own critical path. Utility moves and obstruction removal gated every tunnel contract. Put them on the project schedule with owners and dates, not as assumptions inside other tasks.
  4. Report cost growth against a stated limit. GAO could compare 17.4 percent change-order growth with a 10.7 percent goal because the goal was written down. Track it monthly and escalate breaches early.

Big Dig by the numbers

PlannedActualSource
Cost$2.8 billion (1982 estimate)$14.6 billion (2007, before interest)[1]
Cost including interestNot estimatedAbout $21.93 billion[1]
Interim official estimate$7.8 billion (official, 1996)$10.4 billion (GAO, 1996)[2]
Overrun0%421% nominal; 220% real (Flyvbjerg)[4]
Construction startNot published1991[1]
Completion1998December 2007[1]
Contract change growth10.7% goal17.4% (December 1996)[3]

From the history of managing work: Reference class forecasting (2002–2006), Kahneman and Tversky name the planning fallacy (1977–1979), How Big Things Get Done (2023).

Frequently asked questions about Big Dig

How much over budget was the Big Dig?
The 1982 estimate was $2.8 billion and the project finished at $14.6 billion in 2007, before interest1. That is about 421 percent over in nominal dollars. Because the first estimate was in 1982 dollars, the real-terms overrun is smaller: Bent Flyvbjerg puts it at 220 percent4. Including interest on borrowing, the total is about $21.93 billion1.
How long did the Big Dig take?
Planning began in 1982, construction started in 1991, and the project was declared complete in December 20071. Construction alone took about 16 years. The original plan called for completion in 1998, so the project finished about nine years late1. As late as 1997 the official target for substantial completion was December 20043.
Why did the Big Dig cost so much?
The scope grew after the first estimate, environmental review took seven years while inflation added cost, and tunneling under a working city met utilities, landfill and old foundations1. GAO also found estimates that excluded inflation and contract changes running well above the state's goal23.
Who built the Big Dig?
The Massachusetts Highway Department and later the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority owned the project, with a joint venture of Bechtel and Parsons Brinckerhoff as program manager and many separate construction contractors1. After the 2006 ceiling collapse and the tunnel leaks, the Bechtel and Parsons Brinckerhoff consortium agreed to pay $407 million in restitution1.
What happened in the Big Dig ceiling collapse?
On 10 July 2006 about 26 tons of suspended concrete ceiling in the I-90 connector tunnel fell onto a car and killed the passenger, Milena Del Valle51. The National Transportation Safety Board found that the anchor epoxy had poor creep resistance, and that the designers, the program manager and the supplier had not accounted for it5. The supplier later paid settlements to the family and the state1.

Sources

  1. Big Dig, Wikipedia (accessed October 25, 2026)
  2. Central Artery/Tunnel Project: Cost and Financing (GAO/T-RCED-96-218), US General Accounting Office (accessed October 25, 2026)
  3. Transportation Infrastructure: Progress On and Challenges to Central Artery/Tunnel Project's Costs and Financing (GAO/RCED-97-170), US General Accounting Office (accessed October 25, 2026)
  4. What You Should Know About Megaprojects, and Why: An Overview, Bent Flyvbjerg, Project Management Journal (arXiv preprint) (accessed October 25, 2026)
  5. Ceiling Collapse in the Interstate 90 Connector Tunnel, Boston, Massachusetts, July 10, 2006 (NTSB/HAR-07/02), National Transportation Safety Board (accessed October 25, 2026)

Data: Kanbanchi, kanbanchi.com/gantt-chart-tool/great-projects, licensed CC BY 4.0. Planned means the first publicly approved budget and schedule; see the methodology. Last updated October 25, 2026.

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