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Software and IT · Baltimore (CMS headquarters, Woodlawn, Maryland), United States · 2011–2013

HealthCare.gov launch (Federally Facilitated Marketplace)

The core HealthCare.gov system began as a $93.7 million contract, had more than $209 million obligated by February 2014, and launched on time on 1 October 2013 into weeks of outages.

+123%cost overrun
3 months lateagainst the first plan
$284 millionactual cost in 2025 dollars
Over budget and lateconfidence: medium

HealthCare.gov as a Gantt chart: planned vs actual

Schedule by phase
PhasePlannedActual
Requirements and contractingMar 2010 – Sep 2011Mar 2010 – Dec 2011
Design and buildSep 2011 – Mar 2013Sep 2011 – Sep 2013
Readiness testingMar 2013 – Mar 2013Sep 2013 – Sep 2013
LaunchOct 1, 2013 – Oct 1, 2013Oct 1, 2013 – Oct 1, 2013
Remediation (tech surge)not publishedOct 2013 – Dec 2013
Re-procurement of FFMnot publishedJan 2014 – Jun 2014

The plan

The Affordable Care Act, signed on 23 March 2010, created health insurance marketplaces with coverage starting on 1 January 2014.6 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued the task order for the core federal system, the Federally Facilitated Marketplace (FFM), in September 2011.1 CGI Federal announced the award on 1 December 2011 with an estimated total contract value of $93.7 million: a two-year base of $55.7 million plus three one-year options.4

That $93.7 million is the baseline on this page. It is the expected value of one contract for one system, including option years that ran past the launch, not a budget for HealthCare.gov as a whole. Open enrollment was set for 1 October 2013.6 GAO later found CMS issued the order before key requirements were known, including how many states would rely on the federal marketplace and how many people might enroll.1

The actual figure is GAO's: FFM obligations grew from $56 million in September 2011 to more than $209 million by February 2014.1 Obligations are amounts committed under contract, not final payments, and the $209 million covers the FFM only. It excludes the data services hub, whose obligations grew from $30 million to nearly $85 million, and the replacement FFM contract.1

What actually happened

Contracting before requirements, 2011–2012

CMS used cost-reimbursement contracts, which obliged it to pay allowable costs whether or not the system was finished.1 Requirements kept changing, and GAO found CMS postponed governance reviews and did not obtain required approvals.1

The HHS Inspector General found that no one held clear leadership of the project, which delayed decisions and left tasks unclear.2

Build and squeezed testing, 2013

The FFM readiness assessment planned for March 2013 slipped to September 2013, weeks before launch.1 The Inspector General described HHS and CMS spending too much time on policy and too little on building the site, and continuing on a failing path despite signs of trouble.2

Launch, 1 October 2013

Open enrollment began on the scheduled date, and users met outages and errors at once. Administration official Todd Park said 250,000 people tried to use the site at the same time, against 50,000 to 60,000 expected; more than 8.1 million visited in the first four days.6 Fewer than 27,000 had enrolled through the federal site by 13 November.6

Tech surge, October–December 2013

On 21 October the President announced a tech surge, and Jeffrey Zients was brought in as an adviser.6 CMS and its contractors worked as one team without status distinctions and applied what the Inspector General called ruthless prioritization. High consumer use was restored within about two months.2

By the end of the first open enrollment, federal and state marketplaces together had signed up a little over eight million people.6

Replacing the contractor, 2014

In January 2014 CMS awarded a new FFM contract to another firm, Accenture, for $91 million; by June 2014 its costs had passed $175 million.16 CMS paid the original FFM contractor $12.5 million in fees and declined to pay about $267,000, roughly 2%.1

Why it went the way it did

Contracts signed before requirements were known

GAO found that CMS issued the FFM and data hub task orders while basic sizing questions were open, including how many states would use the federal system and how many people would enroll.1 Under cost-reimbursement terms, every later change was paid for as it came, which is how $56 million in obligations became more than $209 million.1

No single leader over policy and technology

The Inspector General named the absence of clear leadership as the most critical problem. Policy and technical work were poorly coordinated, and the organization's structure and culture slowed progress.2

Testing absorbed the slippage

The launch date did not move, so the late work came out of readiness checks. The FFM readiness assessment slid six months, to September 2013, and required approvals were not obtained before launch.1 CMS also did not properly manage its key development contract, according to the Inspector General.2 Finding problems late and all at once is the main risk in the agile vs waterfall debate, because agile teams test and review in every cycle.

Lessons for project managers

  1. Size the system before signing open-ended contracts. User volumes and state participation were unknown when the FFM order was issued, and obligations nearly quadrupled.1 The gap between estimates and outcomes is set early, when scope is still guesswork.
  2. Give one leader authority over policy and technology. The Inspector General traced delayed decisions to unclear leadership.2 Clear accountability is one of the basic project management principles that big programs skip.
  3. Cut scope before cutting testing. A readiness assessment moved from March to September 2013 left almost no time to act on its results.1 A deadline is only realistic if testing is protected inside it.
  4. In recovery, triage ruthlessly and run one team. The fix took about two months once agency and contractor staff worked as one team on the most important problems first.2

HealthCare.gov by the numbers

PlannedActualSource
FFM (core system) cost$93.7 million (CGI estimated contract value, December 2011)More than $209 million obligated (February 2014)[1]
Data services hub$30 million obligated (September 2011)Nearly $85 million obligated (February 2014)[1]
Replacement FFM contract$91 million (January 2014 award)Over $175 million (June 2014)[1]
All 60 marketplace contracts$1.7 billion original estimated valueNearly $800 million obligated, nearly $500 million paid (February 2014)[3]
Contract startSeptember 2011September 2011[1]
Launch1 October 20131 October 2013 (with widespread failures)[6]
Site working for most users1 October 2013About December 2013[2]

From the history of managing work: Kahneman and Tversky name the planning fallacy (1977–1979), The Agile Manifesto (2001), How Big Things Get Done (2023).

Frequently asked questions about HealthCare.gov

How much over budget was HealthCare.gov?
For the core system, the FFM, CGI Federal announced an estimated contract value of $93.7 million in December 2011.4 GAO found more than $209 million obligated for the FFM by February 2014, about 123% more.1 The two are different measures: one is an expected contract value, the other is money committed. Neither includes the data hub or the replacement contract.1
How much did HealthCare.gov really cost?
It depends on what is counted. The Inspector General found 60 marketplace contracts with original estimated values of $1.7 billion, but nearly $800 million obligated and nearly $500 million paid by February 2014.3 HHS cited $834 million in IT obligations; Bloomberg Government's $2.1 billion added other agencies, a paper-application contract and later spending. A $5 billion figure traces to grants to states.5
Why did HealthCare.gov fail at launch?
GAO found contracts began before requirements were known, requirements kept changing, and the readiness assessment slipped from March to September 2013.1 The Inspector General named unclear leadership as the most critical problem, along with too much focus on policy and too little on technology.2 On launch day far more people tried to use the site at once than it was built for.6
Who built HealthCare.gov?
CGI Federal, a subsidiary of CGI Group, won the contract for the core FFM system in 2011.4 CMS ran the program and managed dozens of other contracts, 60 of which the Inspector General reviewed.3 After the failed launch, QSSI was asked to coordinate fixes, and in January 2014 Accenture replaced CGI as lead contractor.6
How long did it take to fix HealthCare.gov?
About two months. The site opened on 1 October 2013, a tech surge was announced on 21 October, and the Inspector General found that CMS and its contractors had restored the site for high consumer use within roughly two months of launch.62 Rebuilding the FFM under a new contractor continued through 2014.1

Sources

  1. Healthcare.gov: Ineffective Planning and Oversight Practices Underscore the Need for Improved Contract Management (GAO-14-694), U.S. Government Accountability Office (accessed October 25, 2026)
  2. HealthCare.gov: CMS Management of the Federal Marketplace (OEI-06-14-00350), HHS Office of Inspector General (accessed October 25, 2026)
  3. An Overview of 60 Contracts That Contributed to the Development and Operation of the Federal Marketplace, HHS Office of Inspector General (accessed October 25, 2026)
  4. CGI selected to build US-wide competitive health insurance exchange, CGI (accessed October 25, 2026)
  5. Donald Trump says $5 billion website for Obamacare never works, PolitiFact (accessed October 25, 2026)
  6. HealthCare.gov, Wikipedia (accessed October 25, 2026)

Data: Kanbanchi, kanbanchi.com/gantt-chart-tool/great-projects, licensed CC BY 4.0. Planned means the first publicly approved budget and schedule; see the methodology. Last updated October 25, 2026.

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